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The Taller d’Investigació en Filosofia is a graduate workshop in philosophy that every year brings together young scholars in order to promote the 
exchange of ideas with fellow philosophers working on various topics in different 
areas. Starting out as a local graduate workshop, it has over time attracted an 
increasingly wider audience, and by the time of its XX anniversary it has become 
a truly global event that gathers every year participants from all over the world. 
The XX edition of the Taller d’Investigació en Filosofia began with an 
invited talk by Esa Díaz-León, a former participant in the workshop who is 
nowadays a prominent academic philosopher in Spain. Just like her, several 
other participants and organisers of previous editions took part in the event by 
sharing their experience in a round table commemorating its XX anniversary. 
The presence of these philosophers, currently lecturers and professors, underlines 
the relevance of this event for the development of analytic philosophy in our 
country, and for young philosophers who are pursuing a career in the academic 
world. The Taller d’Investigació en Filosofia has proven to be a place for them 
to share their ideas, get in contact with fellow researchers and improve their 
knowledge and skills. 
This special issue brings together the work of several participants of the 
XX edition of the conference. The papers included here are an example of the 
high quality of the contributions, and they also reflect the interdisciplinary 
approach of the event, which covers areas from Philosophy of Science to Political 
Philosophy, as well as Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and 
Epistemology. 
The article by Jansan Favazzo, entitled “Sherlock Holmes Is Not Out 
There: Some Ideas for A Non-Exoticist Account Of Fictional Characters”, 
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sets out to provide a semantics for proper names in fiction from the point of 
view of nominalism and anti-Meinongianism, i.e., without acknowledging the 
existence of any kind of abstracta. The strategy pursued in this paper is a variant 
of the Sellarsian metalinguistic account of abstract terms, which deals with 
statements like “modesty is a virtue” by paraphrasing them away as “all modest-
words are virtue-words”. Favazzo extends this strategy to fictional proper 
names: he proposes that their (secondary) extension be understood as a cluster 
of depictions made in accordance to a certain tradition, and that sentences 
like “Sherlock Holmes is a detective” be paraphrased away accordingly as “all 
Sherlock|Holmes-depictions are detective depictions”. Throughout the paper 
Favazzo provides some hints as to how to understand the notions he employs, 
thus laying the foundations for future work. His discussion briefly covers issues 
such as the proper way to quantify over fictional characters, when to count a 
depiction as fictional, including fictional depictions of real characters such as 
Napoleon in War and Peace, and how to extend his analysis to metatextual 
statements such as “Sherlock Holmes is a famous character”. In sum, the paper 
sets out a promising approach to the semantics of fictional proper names while 
at the same time getting rid of any kind of exotic ontological commitment.
Jaime Soler Parra’s article, “Defining life as a non-essentialist natural 
kind”, addresses the scepticism about the definition of life and explores the 
prospects of characterising life as a non-essentialist natural kind. During the 
last decades, many and diverse definitions of life have been proposed (e.g. 
physiological definitions, genetic definitions, thermodynamic definitions…). 
This multiplicity of proposals, and the inherent absence of consensus, have 
favoured the scepticism about the possibility of defining life. Sceptics argue 
that life can only be defined in a conventional sense, that defining life is either 
impossible or pointless, or that every type of life must be considered as an 
individual. After analysing sceptics’ arguments, Soler claims that all of them 
are based on the same assumption, i.e., defining life requires identifying a basic 
essential property (or a set of basic essential properties). They are effective only 
if that requirement is assumed. Subsequently, after showing that sceptics’ 
assumption does not suit scientists’ practice, he explores the possibility of 
defining life in a non-essentialist way. Within this framework, most proposals 
have characterized life as a homeostatic natural kind. However, that approach 
has outstanding difficulties in accounting for life. Soler argues that a more 
promising strategy would be to define life as a promiscuous natural kind. 
Promiscuous natural kinds not only are compatible with the diffuse limits of 
the notion of life and the fact that kinds are not always defined in exactly 
the same way, they also account for scientists’ use of the concept of life. In 
his article, Soler also discusses the relevance and utility of defining life for 
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scientific research. He considers that it is useful for guiding scientific research 
and avoiding confusing results. 
Finally, in “The Egalitarian Quality of Lottocracy”, Julia Jakobi explores 
the way in which lottocratic systems, where politicians are randomly selected 
out of the totality of citizens entitled to vote, could satisfy the egalitarian 
requirement of democracy. There is broad consensus on the idea that democracy 
is the most desirable politic system available. Authors have argued for its value 
on the grounds of instrumental or egalitarian reasons: democratic decision-
making tends to render good and epistemically valuable results and democracy 
is a source of political equality. The proponents of lottocratic models, however, 
claim that replacing the right to vote by the chance to be selected can satisfy 
both the epistemic and egalitarian values of democracy. Jakobi focuses on 
the latter and argues that, in addition to improving the representation of 
the population and reducing undemocratic influences, as some proponents 
have pointed out, having a chance to be selected by lot satisfies the intrinsic 
value of democracy in a relevant way. It does so by enhancing political justice 
and providing citizens with an equal chance on political influence. After 
examining the reasons why political equality is considered a key element of a 
desirable political system, Jakobi addresses two possible ways in which we can 
understand such notion. She holds that political equality can be conceived of 
as political justice and as vertical equality of influence, and provides arguments 
that show that a lottocratic system satisfies them both. 
During the last two decades the Taller d’Investigació en Filosofia has served 
as a forum of discussion and exchange for the younger generations of academic 
philosophers in Spain. It has fueled the academic career of many former 
participants who have seen their work published as a result of the valuable 
feedback and new ideas they received. We hope that this workshop will continue 
to perform such significant role for future generations in philosophy to come.
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